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Causes of the Financial Crisis 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] The current financial crisis began in August 2007, when financial stability replaced inflation as 
the Federal Reserve’s chief concern. The roots of the crisis go back much further, and there are various 
views on the fundamental causes. 
It is generally accepted that credit standards in U.S. mortgage lending were relaxed in the early 2000s, 
and that rising rates of delinquency and foreclosures delivered a sharp shock to a range of U.S. financial 
institutions. Beyond that point of agreement, however, there are many questions that will be debated by 
policymakers and academics for decades. 
Why did the financial shock from the housing market downturn prove so difficult to contain? Why did the 
tools the Fed used successfully to limit damage to the financial system from previous shocks (the Asian 
crises of 1997-1998, the stock market crashes of 1987 and 2000-2001, the junk bond debacle in 1989, the 
savings and loan crisis, 9/11, and so on) fail to work this time? If we accept that the origins are in the 
United States, why were so many financial systems around the world swept up in the panic? 
To what extent were long-term developments in financial markets to blame for the instability? Derivatives 
markets, for example, were long described as a way to spread financial risk more efficiently, so that 
market participants could bear only those risks they understood. Did derivatives, and other risk 
management techniques, actually increase risk and instability under crisis conditions? Was there too 
much reliance on computer models of market performance? Did those models reflect only the post-WWII 
period, which may now come to be viewed not as a typical 60-year period, suitable for use as a baseline 
for financial forecasts, but rather as an unusually favorable period that may not recur? 
Did government actions inadvertently create the conditions for crisis? Did regulators fail to use their 
authority to prevent excessive risk-taking, or was their jurisdiction too limited and/or compartmentalized? 
While some may insist that there is a single cause, and thus a simple remedy, the sheer number of causal 
factors that have been identified tends to suggest that the current financial situation is not yet fully 
understood in its full complexity. This report consists of a table that summarizes very briefly some of the 
arguments for particular causes, presents equally brief rejoinders, and includes a reference or two for 
further reading. It will be updated as required by market developments. 
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The current financial crisis began in August 2007, when financial stability replaced inflation as 
the Federal Reserve’s chief concern. The roots of the crisis go back much further, and there are 
various views on the fundamental causes. 
It is generally accepted that credit standards in U.S. mortgage lending were relaxed in the early 
2000s, and that rising rates of delinquency and foreclosures delivered a sharp shock to a range of 
U.S. financial institutions. Beyond that point of agreement, however, there are many questions 
that will be debated by policymakers and academics for decades. 
Why did the financial shock from the housing market downturn prove so difficult to contain? 
Why did the tools the Fed used successfully to limit damage to the financial system from previous 
shocks (the Asian crises of 1997-1998, the stock market crashes of 1987 and 2000-2001, the junk 
bond debacle in 1989, the savings and loan crisis, 9/11, and so on) fail to work this time? If we 
accept that the origins are in the United States, why were so many financial systems around the 
world swept up in the panic? 
To what extent were long-term developments in financial markets to blame for the instability? 
Derivatives markets, for example, were long described as a way to spread financial risk more 
efficiently, so that market participants could bear only those risks they understood. Did 
derivatives, and other risk management techniques, actually increase risk and instability under 
crisis conditions? Was there too much reliance on computer models of market performance? Did 
those models reflect only the post-WWII period, which may now come to be viewed not as a 
typical 60-year period, suitable for use as a baseline for financial forecasts, but rather as an 
unusually favorable period that may not recur? 
Did government actions inadvertently create the conditions for crisis? Did regulators fail to use 
their authority to prevent excessive risk-taking, or was their jurisdiction too limited and/or 
compartmentalized? 
While some may insist that there is a single cause, and thus a simple remedy, the sheer number of 
causal factors that have been identified tends to suggest that the current financial situation is not 
yet fully understood in its full complexity. This report consists of a table that summarizes very 
briefly some of the arguments for particular causes, presents equally brief rejoinders, and includes 










The financial crisis that began in 2007 spread and gathered intensity in 2008, despite the efforts 
of central banks and regulators to restore calm. By early 2009, the financial system and the global 
economy appeared to be locked in a descending spiral, and the primary focus of policy became 
the prevention of a prolonged downturn on the order of the Great Depression. 
The volume and variety of negative financial news, and the seeming impotence of policy 
responses, has raised new questions about the origins of financial crises and the market 
mechanisms by which they are contained or propagated. Just as the economic impact of financial 
market failures in the 1930s remains an active academic subject, it is likely that the causes of the 
current crisis will be debated for decades to come. 
This report sets out in tabular form a number of the factors that have been identified as causes of 
the crisis. The left column of Table 1 below summarizes the causal role of each such factor. The 
next column presents a brief rejoinder to that argument. The right-hand column contains a 
reference for further reading. Where text is given in quotation marks, the reference in the right 
column is the source, unless otherwise specified. 
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Table 1. Causes of the Financial Crisis 
Cause Argument Rejoinder Additional Reading 
Imprudent 
Mortgage Lending 
Against a backdrop of abundant credit, low interest rates, and 
rising house prices, lending standards were relaxed to the point 
that many people were able to buy houses they couldn’t afford. 
When prices began to fall and loans started going bad, there was 
a severe shock to the financial system. 
Imprudent lending certainly played a role, 
but subprime loans (about $1 – 1.5 
trillion currently outstanding) were a 
relatively small part of the overall U.S. 
mortgage market (about $11 trillion) and 
of total credit market debt outstanding 
(about $50 trillion). 
CRS Report RL33775, Alternative 
Mortgages: Causes and Policy Implications 
of Troubled Mortgage Resets in the 
Subprime and Alt-A Markets, by Edward 
V. Murphy. 
Housing Bubble With its easy money policies, the Federal Reserve allowed 
housing prices to rise to unsustainable levels. The crisis was 
triggered by the bubble bursting, as it was bound to do. 
It is difficult to identify a bubble until it 
bursts, and Fed actions to suppress the 
bubble may do more damage to the 
economy than waiting and responding to 
the effects of the bubble bursting. 
CRS Report RL33666, Asset Bubbles: 
Economic Effects and Policy Options for 
the Federal Reserve, by Marc Labonte. 
Global Imbalances Global financial flows have been characterized in recent years by 
an unsustainable pattern: some countries (China, Japan, and 
Germany) run large surpluses every year, while others (like the 
U.S and U.K.) run deficits. The U.S. external deficits have been 
mirrored by internal deficits in the household and government 
sectors. U.S. borrowing cannot continue indefinitely; the 
resulting stress underlies current financial disruptions. 
None of the adjustments that would 
reverse the fundamental imbalances has 
yet occurred. That is, there has not been 
a sharp fall in the dollar’s exchange value, 
and U.S. deficits persist.  
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, “The financial 
crisis and global imbalances – two sides 
of the same coin,” Speech at the Asia 
Europe Economic Forum, Beijing, Dec. 
9, 2008. 
http://www.bis.org/review/r081212d.pdf 
Securitization Securitization fostered the “originate-to-distribute” model, which 
reduced lenders’ incentives to be prudent, especially in the face 
of vast investor demand for subprime loans packaged as AAA 
bonds. Ownership of mortgage-backed securities was widely 
dispersed, causing repercussions throughout the global system 
when subprime loans went bad in 2007. 
Mortgage loans that were not securitized, 
but kept on the originating lender’s 
books, have also done poorly. 
Statement of Alan Greenspan before 
the House Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform, October 23, 
2008 (“The breakdown has been most 
apparent in the securitization of home 
mortgages.”) 
  





“Throughout the housing finance value chain, many participants 
contributed to the creation of bad mortgages and the selling of 
bad securities, apparently feeling secure that they would not be 
held accountable for their actions. A lender could sell exotic 
mortgages to home-owners, apparently without fear of 
repercussions if those mortgages failed. Similarly, a trader could 
sell toxic securities to investors, apparently without fear of 
personal responsibility if those contracts failed. And so it was for 
brokers, realtors, individuals in rating agencies, and other market 
participants, each maximizing his or her own gain and passing 
problems on down the line until the system itself collapsed. 
Because of the lack of participant accountability, the originate-to-
distribute model of mortgage finance, with its once great promise 
of managing risk, became itself a massive generator of risk.” 
Many contractual arrangements did 
provide recourse against sellers or 
issuers of bad mortgages or related 
securities. Many non-bank mortgage 
lenders failed because they were forced 
to take back loans that defaulted, and 
many lawsuits have been filed against MBS 
issuers and others. 
Statement of the Honorable John W. 
Snow before the House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, 
October 23, 2008 
Rating Agencies The credit rating agencies gave AAA ratings to numerous issues 
of subprime mortgage-backed securities, many of which were 
subsequently downgraded to junk status. Critics cite poor 
economic models, conflicts of interest, and lack of effective 
regulation as reasons for the rating agencies’ failure. Another 
factor is the market’s excessive reliance on ratings, which has 
been reinforced by numerous laws and regulations that use 
ratings as a criterion for permissible investments or as a factor in 
required capital levels. 
All market participants underestimated 
risk, not just the rating agencies. 
Purchasers of MBS were mainly 
sophisticated institutional investors, who 
should have done their own due diligence 
investigations into the quality of the 
instruments. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 
“SEC Approves Measures to 
Strengthen Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies,” press release 2008-284, 
Dec. 3, 2008. 
Mark-to-market 
Accounting 
FASB standards require institutions to report the fair (or current 
market) value of securities they hold. Critics of the rule argue 
that this forces banks to recognize losses based on “fire sale” 
prices that prevail in distressed markets, prices believed to be 
below long-term fundamental values. Those losses undermine 
market confidence and exacerbate banking system problems. 
Some propose suspending mark-to-market; EESA requires a 
study of its impact. 
Many view uncertainty regarding financial 
institutions’ true condition as key to the 
crisis. If accounting standards—however 
imperfect—are relaxed, fears that 
published balance sheets are unreliable 
will grow. 
“Understanding the Mark-to-market 
Meltdown,” Euromoney, Mar. 2008.  
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Cause Argument Rejoinder Additional Reading 
Deregulatory 
Legislation 
Laws such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) permitted 
financial institutions to engage in unregulated risky transactions 
on a vast scale. The laws were driven by an excessive faith in the 
robustness of market discipline, or self-regulation. 
GLBA and CFMA did not permit the 
creation of unregulated markets and 
activities; they simply codified existing 
markets and practices. (“There is this 
idea afloat that if you had more 
regulation you would have fewer 
mistakes,” [Gramm] said. “I don’t see any 
evidence in our history or anybody else’s 
to substantiate it.” Eric Lipton and 
Stephen Labaton, “The Reckoning: 
Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed,” 
New York Times, Nov. 16, 2008.) 
Anthony Faiola, Ellen Nakashima, and 
Jill Drew, “What Went Wrong?” 
Washington Post, Oct. 15, 2008, p. A1. 
Shadow Banking 
System 
Risky financial activities once confined to regulated banks (use of 
leverage, borrowing short-term to lend long,, etc.) migrated 
outside the explicit government safety net provided by deposit 
insurance and safety and soundness regulation. Mortgage lending, 
in particular, moved out of banks into unregulated institutions. 
This unsupervised risk-taking amounted to a financial house of 
cards. 
Regulated banks—the recipients of most 
of the $700 billion Treasury TARP 
program—have not really fared much 
better than investment banks, hedge 
funds, OTC derivatives dealers, private 
equity firms, et al. 
Nouriel Roubini, “The Shadow Banking 
System is Unravelling,” Financial Times, 
Sep. 22, 2008, p. 9. 
Non-Bank Runs As institutions outside the banking system built up financial 
positions built on borrowing short and lending long, they became 
vulnerable to liquidity risk in the form of non-bank runs. That is, 
they could fail if markets lost confidence and refused to extend 
or roll over short-term credit, as happened to Bear Stearns and 
others. 
Liquidity risk was always present, and 
recognized, but its appearance at the 
extreme levels of the current crisis was 
not foreseeable. 
Krishna Guha, “Bundesbank Chief Says 
Credit Crisis Has Hallmarks of Classic 




Many banks established off-the-books special purpose entities 
(including structured investment vehicles, or SIVs) to engage in 
risky speculative investments. This allowed banks to make more 
loans during the expansion, but also created contingent liabilities 
that, with the onset of the crisis, reduced market confidence in 
the banks’ creditworthiness. At the same time, they had allowed 
banks to hold less capital against potential losses. Investors had 
little ability to understand banks’ true financial positions. 
Beginning in the 1990s, bank supervisors 
actually encouraged off-balance sheet 
finance as a legitimate way to manage 
risk. 
Adrian Blundell-Wignall, “Structured 
Products: Implications for Financial 
Markets,” Financial Market Trends, Nov. 




Federal mandates to help low-income borrowers (e.g., the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac’s affordable housing goals) forced banks to engage in 
imprudent mortgage lending. 
The subprime mortgage boom was led by 
non-bank lenders (not subject to CRA) 
and securitized by private investment 
banks rather than the GSEs. 
Lawrence H. White, “How Did We 
Get into This Financial Mess?” Cato 
Institute Briefing Paper no. 110, Nov. 
18, 2008. 
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Cause Argument Rejoinder Additional Reading 
Failure of Risk 
Management 
Systems 
Some firms separated analysis of market risk and credit risk. This 
division did not work for complex structured products, where 
those risks were indistinguishable. “Collective common sense 
suffered as a result.” 
Senior management’s responsibility has 
always been to bridge this kind of gap in 
risk assessment. 
“Confessions of a Risk Manager; A 
Personal View of the Crisis,” The 
Economist, Aug. 9, 2008.  
Financial Innovation New instruments in structured finance developed so rapidly that 
market infrastructure and systems were not prepared when 
those instruments came under stress. Some propose that 
markets in new instruments should be given time to mature 
before they are permitted to attain a systemically-significant size. 
This means giving accountants, regulators, ratings agencies, and 
settlement systems time to catch up. 
In a global marketplace, innovation will 
continue and national regulators’ 
attempts to restrain it will only put their 
countries’ markets at a competitive 
disadvantage. Moreover, it is hard to tell 
in advance whether innovations will 
stabilize the system or the reverse. 
Joseph R. Mason, “The Summer of ‘07 
and the Shortcomings of Financial 
Innovation,” Journal of Applied Finance, 
vol. 18, Spring 2008, p. 8. 
Complexity The complexity of certain financial instruments at the heart of 
the crisis had three effects: (1) investors were unable to make 
independent judgments on the merits of investments, (2) risks of 
market transactions were obscured, and (3) regulators were 
baffled. 
Standard economic theory assumes that 
investors act rationally in their own self-
interest, which implies that they should 
only take risks they understand. 
Lee Buchheit, “We Made It Too 
Complicated,” International Financial Law 
Review, Mar. 2008. 
Human Frailty Behavioral finance posits that investors do not always make 
optimal choices: they suffer from “bounded rationality” and 
limited self-control. Regulators ought to help people manage 
complexity through better disclosure and by reinforcing financial 
prudence. 
Since regulators are just as human as 
investors, how can they consistently 
recognize that behavior has become 
suboptimal and that markets are headed 
for a crash? 
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, 
“Human Frailty Caused This Crisis,” 
Financial Times, Nov. 12, 2008. 
Bad Computer 
Models 
Expectations of the performance of complex structured products 
linked to mortgages were based on only a few decades worth of 
data. In the case of subprime loans, only a few years of data were 
available. “[C]omplex systems are not confined to historical 
experience. Events of any size are possible, and limited only by 
the scale of the system itself.” 
Blaming models and the “quants” who 
designed them mistakes a symptom for a 
cause—“garbage in, garbage out.” 
James G. Rickards, “A Mountain, 
Overlooked: How Risk Models Failed 
Wall St. and Washington, ”Washington 
Post, Oct. 2, 2008, p. A23. 
Excessive Leverage In the post-2000 period of low interest rates and abundant 
capital, fixed income yields were low. To compensate, many 
investors used borrowed funds to boost the return on their 
capital. Excessive leverage magnified the impact of the housing 
downturn, and deleveraging caused the interbank credit market 
to tighten. 
Leverage is only a symptom of the 
underlying problem: mispricing of risk and 
a credit bubble. 
Timothy F. Geithner, “Systemic Risk 
and Financial Markets,” Testimony 
before the House Committee on 
Financial Services, July 24, 2008.  
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Cause Argument Rejoinder Additional Reading 
Relaxed Regulation 
of Leverage 
The SEC liberalized its net capital rule in 2004, allowing 
investment bank holding companies to attain very high leverage 
ratios. Its Consolidated Supervised Entities program, which 
applied to the largest investment banks, was voluntary and 
ineffective. 
The net capital rule applied only to the 
regulated broker/dealer unit; the SEC 
never had statutory authority to limit 
leverage at the holding company level.  
Stephen Labaton, “Agency‘s ‘04 Rule 
Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and 
Risk,” New York Times, Oct. 3, 2008, p. 
A1, and Testimony of SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox, House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee, Oct. 
23, 2008. (Response to question from 
Rep. Christopher Shays.) 
Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS) 
“An interesting paradox arose, however, as credit derivatives 
instruments, developed initially for risk management, continued 
to grow and become more sophisticated with the help of 
financial engineering, the tail began wagging the dog. In becoming 
a medium for speculative transactions, credit derivatives 
increased, rather than alleviated, risk.” 
Speculation in derivatives generally makes 
prices of the underlying commodities 
more stable. We do not know why this 
relationship sometimes breaks down. 
Even in CDS, the feared “explosion” of 
defaults has not happened, albeit the 
expensive rescue of AIG may have 
prevented such an event. 
Jongho Kim, “From Vanilla Swaps to 
Exotic Credit Derivatives,” Fordham 
Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, Vol. 
13, No. 5 (2008), p. 705. 
Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives 
Because OTC derivatives (including credit swaps) are largely 
unregulated, limited information about risk exposures is available 
to regulators and market participants. This helps explain the Bear 
Stearns and AIG interventions: in addition to substantial losses to 
counterparties, a dealer default could trigger panic because of 
uncertainty about the extent and distribution of those losses. 
The largest OTC markets—interest rate 
and currency swaps—appear to have held 
up fairly well. 
Walter Lukken, “How to Solve the 
Derivatives Problem,” Wall Street 
Journal, Oct. 10, 2008, p. A15. 
Fragmented 
Regulation 
U.S. financial regulation is dispersed among many agencies, each 
with responsibility for a particular class of financial institution. As 
a result, no agency is well-positioned to monitor emerging 
system-wide problems. 
Countries with unified regulatory 
structures, such as Japan and the UK, 
have not avoided the crisis. 
U.S. Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized 
Financial Regulatory Structure, Apr. 2008. 
No Systemic Risk 
Regulator 
No regulator had comprehensive jurisdiction over all 
systemically-important financial institutions. (The Fed had the 
role of systemic risk regulator by default, but lacked authority to 
oversee investment banks, hedge funds, nonbank derivatives 
dealers, etc.) 
Some question whether the problem was 
lack of authority or failure to use existing 
regulatory powers effectively. 
Henry Kaufman, “Finance’s Upper Tier 
Needs Closer Scrutiny,” Financial Times, 
Apr. 21, 2008, p. 13. 
Short-term 
Incentives 
Since traders and managers at many financial institutions receive 
a large part of their compensation in the form of an annual 
bonus, they lack incentives to avoid risky strategies liable to fail 
spectacularly every five or ten years. Some propose to link pay 
to a rolling average of firm profits or to put bonuses into escrow 
for a certain period, or to impose higher capital charges on banks 
that maintain current annual bonus practices. 
Shareholders already have incentives and 
authority to monitor corporate 
compensation structures and levels. 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, “Rein in Chief’s 
Pay? It’s Doable,” New York Times, Nov. 
3, 2008. 
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Cause Argument Rejoinder Additional Reading 
Tail Risk Many investors and risk managers sought to boost their returns 
by providing insurance or writing options against low-probability 
financial events. (Credit default swaps are a good example, but by 
no means the only one.) These strategies generate a stream of 
small gains under normal market conditions, but cause large 
losses during crises. When market participants know that many 
such potential losses are distributed throughout the system (but 
do not know exactly where, or how large), uncertainty and fear 
are exacerbated when markets come under stress. 
Dispersal of systematic risk via financial 
innovation was believed to make the 
financial system more resilient to shocks. 
Raghuram Rajan, “A Tale of Two 
Liquidities,” Remarks at the University 
of Chicago Graduate School of 
Business, Dec. 5, 2007, online at 
http://www.chicagogsb.edu/news/12-5-
07_Rajan.pdf. 
Black Swan Theory This crisis is a once-in-a-century event, caused by a confluence of 
factors so rare that it is impractical to think of erecting 
regulatory barriers against recurrences. According to Alan 
Greenspan, such regulation would be “so onerous as to basically 
suppress the growth rate of the economy and ... [U.S.] standards 
of living.” Testimony before the House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee, Oct. 23, 2008. 
“Some might be tempted to see recent 
events in the financial markets as just 
such black swans. But this would be quite 
wrong, in our view. Many of the flaws 
that have led to current turbulent 
conditions have not ridden on the back of 
a black swan. Instead, they are the result 
of weaknesses and failings in the 
interpretation of risk analysis and the 
process of oversight.” (Booth and 
Mazzawi) 
Geoff Booth and Elias Mazzawi, “Black 
Swan or Fat Turkey?” Business Strategy 
Review, vol. 19, Autumn 2008, p. 34. 
Also: Michael J. Boskin, “Our Next 
President and the Perfect Economic 
Storm,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 23, 
2008, p. A17. 
Source: Table Compiled by CRS. 
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